Here’s an ominous juxtaposition of stories from today’s news. First, this poll:
A near-majority of Americans say the United States should become less active in world affairs, a dramatic change from the post-9/11 national environment and one that comes as President Barack Obama tries to juggle crises in the Middle East and the Ukraine.
In a new NBC News/ Wall Street Journal poll, 47 percent of respondents said the U.S. should dial down its activity in foreign affairs, versus 19 percent who said the country should be more active around the globe. Three in ten respondents said the current level is correct.
That represents a major flip in how Americans view world affairs since the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. At that time, nearly 4 in ten Americans said they wanted to see more engagement around the world, and just 14 percent said the nation should be less active.
Comparable studies in the mid-1990s found that about a third of Americans believed the U.S. should reduce its foreign policy footprint….
Hmmm… I wonder… Could that be the same 47 percent Mitt Romney was on about?
Meanwhile, we have this item from The Guardian, which no one could mistake for a pro-interventionist newspaper:
The biggest geopolitical risk of our times is not a conflict between Israel and Iran over nuclear proliferation. Nor is it the risk of chronic disorder in an arc of instability that now runs from the Maghreb all the way to the Hindu Kush. It is not even the risk of Cold War II between Russia and the West over Ukraine.
All of these are serious risks, of course; but none is as serious as the challenge of sustaining the peaceful character of China‘s rise. That is why it is particularly disturbing to hear Japanese and Chinese officials and analysts compare the countries’ bilateral relationship to that between Britain and Germany on the eve of the first world war.
The disputes between China and several of its neighbours over disputed islands and maritime claims (starting with the conflict with Japan) are just the tip of the iceberg. As China becomes an even greater economic power, it will become increasingly dependent on shipping routes for its imports of energy, other inputs, and goods. This implies the need to develop a blue-water navy to ensure that China’s economy cannot be strangled by a maritime blockade.
But what China considers a defensive imperative could be perceived as aggressive and expansionist by its neighbours and the United States. And what looks like a defensive imperative to the US and its Asian allies – building further military capacity in the region to manage China’s rise – could be perceived by China as an aggressive attempt to contain it….
It’s no accident that we see Americans gazing into their isolationist navels, anxiously taking their own temperatures, while a British publication gazes out at the world as it is. Even as it ceased to rule half the world, Britain has remained at least interested in what happens around the globe. Whereas the average American on the street will always default to isolationism, barring catastrophic events that temporarily turn his attention abroad.
Which, in a world that has relied since 1945, and especially since 1991, on American engagement — economic, diplomatic, humanitarian and yes, military — as a stabilizing force, is not a good thing.
For a generation, China has steadily been engaging more closely with the world, including nations in our own Monroe-Doctrine backyard. One of the first editorials I wrote for The State in 1994 was on the subject of Chinese diplomatic and trade initiatives in the Western Hemisphere. They have been so successful that, according to Stratfor, a Chinese economic slowdown has a deleterious effect on the region:
A looming slowdown in the Chinese economy promises trouble for China’s economic partners in Latin America, especially commodity exporters. The growing relationship between China and Latin America is on display this week as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi tours the region in a trip that will wrap up April 26. Wang is visiting Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina to discuss bilateral financing and trade deals.
China’s slowing economy and potential for domestic economic instability threatens to sharply lower demand for key commodities exported by Latin American countries. Particularly vulnerable are countries such as Brazil, Peru and Chile that have seen China rise in importance as an export destination…
My relativist friends will say that’s fine. We had our time; maybe it’s China’s turn. All nations are alike — there’s nothing exceptional about our own; any perception to the contrary is pure, narrow chauvinism — and a world in which China is the dominant influencer is no worse than one that turns to America.
As you know, I believe they couldn’t be more wrong.
Fortunately, everyone who has held the White House in my lifetime agrees with me — or at the very least says he agrees with me, whatever his actions may say. Our serious political discussions tend to be about ways and means, not ultimate aims. In fact, while he was defending a foreign policy based on the assumption that intervening in Iraq was the worst foreign policy mistake of our time (with which I’m bound to disagree, at least somewhat), I rather like the president’s invocation of a doctrine based on singles and doubles rather than home runs:
MANILA — At a news conference in the Philippines on Monday afternoon, President Obama initially scoffed when a reporter asked him to explain the “Obama doctrine” in light of his handling of recent world events.
But then he seemed to embrace the idea. Surveying hot spots from Syria to Ukraine, Obama laid out an incremental, dogged approach to foreign relations that relies on the United States deploying every possible economic and institutional lever before resorting to armed force.
“That may not always be sexy. That may not always attract a lot of attention, and it doesn’t make for good argument on Sunday morning shows,” said Obama, who is nearing the end of a week-long, four-nation tour of Asia. “But it avoids errors. You hit singles, you hit doubles; every once in a while we may be able to hit a home run. But we steadily advance the interests of the American people and our partnership with folks around the world.”…
The problem with isolationists is that they don’t even want us to get up to bat. They don’t even want to show up for the game. Which is not good for the country, and even worse for the rest of the world.
The president in the Philippines — reaching out, engaging with the world.
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China is looking at two American allies (the Philippines and Japan) that are essentially defended by America and America’s nuclear umbrella. And now, whether or not we defend them from Chinese aggression is an open question. That’s bad – and I’ll tell you why.
Once American allies believe that our defense guarantees are a hollow gesture, they will begin to develop and secure their own defenses, and we have been taking that for granted for a long time. For instance, Europe has no defense capabilities to speak of. That’s not going to happen in perpetuity.
If the US ends up abdicating its role as the guarantor of the NATO alliance and our allies such as Japan and the Philippines, then we will be leaving space for these individual nations to develop their own forces out of necessity.
Essentially, the nations will begin to balance against each other. That balancing will be self-perpetuating. Japan will have to balance against China. The Baltic States will have to balance against Russia. It will grow and grow. Then we will have what will essentially be a multi-polar world in terms of military power – like in the 1920s and 1930s.
That’s bad. All of these balancing forces act in relation to each other in ways that are unpredictable. And that ultimately leads to a military confrontation, which can then catch fire.
And even if America abdicates its leadership role as the guarantor, we will still be the hegemon. (We’ll be the hegemon for at least the next 50-80 years or so.) So, we’ll be drawn into one (or more) of these conflicts.
Accordingly, it’s in our interest to ensure that there is no conflict between two nations. Because we’ll be almost assuredly drawn in to any conflict between any European nations, Japan, China, or otherwise.
Aside from the military aspect, we want to maintain a world economic and trade system that is maintained and secured by military force if need be. But it’s much harder to secure the world’s trade if you have many, different, competing poles of power, seeking to create little places of their protection for trade. China just did this recently.
Eventually, transit such as shipping lanes and air corridors could be closed. And that leads to miscalculation by other nations…which leads to war…which we want to avoid.
That’s why we want to “get out in front” of this sort of thing. We don’t want to allow bigger, broader conflicts to come up.
The problem with isolationists who advocate “staying out of it” in certain areas of the world is that they don’t realize that “staying out of it” isn’t a permanent decision. Sooner or later, the US will be involved.
The only question is do we want to be involved up front, with minimal conflict, or do we want to wait to get dragged into a shooting war between nation states later?
That’s the Caskey Doctrine, anyway. (For whatever it’s worth.)
Well said.
Amen! Good one, Bryan!
Isn’t the “flip” in American attitudes a result of the performance of the government/military since 9/11? There was the big sell job on using our forces to bring democracy and justice to the world. Then what happened? Not so much. Unless you count spending a trillion dollars and killing thousands of Americans.
American’s will support a policy that works, not a policy based on a philosophy.
And, really, if if weren’t for the royal family, would anyone really care what Britain thinks any more? Where does it rank in terms of relevance any more? They’re like the old uncle who comes to dinner to tell his war stories and then steps away from the table when the check comes.
The vagueness of these poll questions renders any deep interpretation of the numbers meaningless. What is it to be “more active” or “less active” in world affairs? Some of those who picked “less active” may indeed be what you term isolationists in the true sense of the word. Many others may feel that “active” is referring to military engagement and involvement around the world, and feel that this is what should be dialed back. The same goes for those who picked “more” involvement around the globe: maybe some want a more robust military footprint everywhere, but others think we should project more “soft power” globally, in some fashion.
If you are characterizing everybody who takes a more conservative view of the proper role of US military involvement worldwide as being “isolationist,” that does little to advance your argument. In today’s global economy and globalized media, it’s also less true than ever that the average American on the street “will always default to isolationism,” unless you call anyone who ever questions the wisdom and/or morality of American military force in certain situations around the globe an isolationist. This is just the straw man you periodically drag out.
I fully agree with your sense that it’s important for all of us, Americans included, to be “interested in what happens around the globe,” and to stay engaged with it. But it’s interesting that the Guardian article you cite as a laudable example of this clear-eyed “seeing the world as it is,” is very precise and not at all one-sided in laying out the nature of the China challenge. That is, they point out that China views certain of their actions as defensive from their standpoint, but hostile from our standpoint, while the reverse is also true—some of the West’s actions we see as a “defensive imperative” whereas China sees this as aggressively hostile.
This basic understanding: that indeed there really is not such a thing as “the world as it is,” as you call it, but rather, the world as each nation or each power perceives it in the context of its own interests—-grasping that THIS is at the heart of all human and international conflicts is the key to resolving or at least managing those conflicts. Why do you believe that there has to be ONE “dominant influencer” anyway? This is not the world as it is, nor is it likely to be the world to come either. As far as China goes, I don’t see Chinese troops and ships and military bases scattered around the globe in any numbers remotely, remotely approaching America’s…I’m not saying that the future is all rosy, but let’s get real before we worry about the US being supplanted as the dominant “stabilizing” force in the world.
So yes, let’s indeed see the world as it is, not just the world as it looks from America’s perspective. For example, managing the “peaceful rise” of China requires restraint, wisdom, and ongoing constant communication from China AND from the West. And that doesn’t require us to view “all nations as the same” or even to give up our notion of being exceptional. But we do have to remember that other nations may see themselves that way, too.
Phillip, thanks as always for the thoughtfulness of your reply.
On the vagueness of the wording… I realize that we never know exactly how each respondent understands the question, but I found the wording about as good as it could be, if you’re measuring where people are on an axis running from isolationism to engagement. The wording was, “should the United States become more active in world affairs, less active in world affairs, or continue its current level of activity in world affairs.” That language seems very inclusive, and it seems unlikely to me that very many people would see it solely in terms of military engagement.
Unfortunately, NBC presented the result in a way that suggested military engagement, with that huge picture of U.S. airborne troops across the top of the web page. But respondents weren’t looking at that picture.
If you think I’m “characterizing everybody who takes a more conservative view of the proper role of US military involvement worldwide as being ‘isolationist,’ I’ve wasted a lot of words over the years. If I mean military engagement, I’ll say so. But when I’m talking about isolationism, I mean the urge to pull back from the world in every way. (And I’ve been clear at least since September 2001 that I believe we must be ENGAGED in every way.) And I think it’s reasonable to draw the conclusion that this poll measured an increase in the desire to turn away from the world in general.
I’d like to see an elaboration on you part on the assertion that “it’s also less true than ever that the average American on the street ‘will always default to isolationism’.” Maybe if you’re comparing now to the early 1800s, or the 1930s, we might be a tad less isolationist now. But I must conclude that we are much more isolationist than we were during the early 1940s (at least, after December 1941), during the Cold War, or in the two or three years after 9/11.
Again, you assume — with I think little provocation — that I think of engagement solely in military terms when you say, “As far as China goes, I don’t see Chinese troops and ships and military bases scattered around the globe in any numbers remotely, remotely approaching America’s.” Two points about that — first, we’ve significantly scaled back our presence around the world, save in Afghanistan. Closing Subic Bay alone was enormous. But the more important point is that I’m NOT talking militarily in terms of the ways China has gained on us in influence. In the Americas alone, China has made fast friendships in Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, Cuba and to a lesser extent in other countries — friendships based in trade and aid. From what I’ve seen over the last couple of decades, it has seemed to me that China has shown much more interest in our neighbors than we have, and that worries me. A lot of people thought I was nuts to cite their respective positions on the Columbia Free Trade Agreement as a reason to prefer McCain over Obama in 2008, but that was in the context of my concern, ever since I lived in Ecuador as a child, that this country neglects Latin America, and should not do so.
Next, if you review my words, I think you’ll see that when I say “see the world as it is” in relation to a story that so obviously, as you point out, considers differing perspectives of different nations, I am very deliberately praising the story for the same thing you are praising it for. That very aspect which you like inspired me to write those particular words. And it surprises me that you would assume that I meant something else, and that I might have somehow missed that aspect. Or do I misunderstand what you are suggesting?
I respect you so much Phillip, that it continues to distress me that you often ascribe to me a sort of limited, narrow perspective, assuming I don’t see things you see. Generally speaking, I see what you see, and I take it completely into account, in drawing my rather different conclusions. Just because we see things differently doesn’t mean we’re not examining the same facts. And that is “the world as it is,” here on the blog…
There’s a long history of competition, warfare and strife between the Chinese and the Japanese. For nations dependent on trade, defending sea lines of communication is a vital national interest.
As nations begin to realize that the American security guarantee isn’t worth the paper it’s written on, we’ll certainly see regional economic powers begin to assemble some military might. Japan, if they so desired, could become a nuclear power very quickly, perhaps in a matter of months. Fielding advanced weapon systems and developing a sizeable and skilled cadre of professional NCO’s and officers would take a decade or more, though.
One thing that regional powers may find difficult will be the ability to project power, to operate at any distance from their home ports, bases and borders. Aircraft carriers, forward bases, aerial refueling, long range bombers, transports, that sort of thing will be difficult to achieve. This difficulty will limit the effectiveness and perhaps even the overall development of regional militaries.
Asymmetric warfare will be the future. Small, flexible, cheap defense forces capable of hobbling or restricting the operations of larger more expensive militaries. Most countries will be able to master this. Speedboats capable of destroying large surface vessels in coastal waters, low tech communications to avoid our electronic surveilliance, cheap drones to supply information, portable anti-air and anti-armor missles, and small squads of highly trained troops.
Power projection – anywhere on earth in a matter of days if not less – is the ultimate in asymmetric warfare.
It’s a unique ability we should not so easily give up.
Absolutely. Count me as one guy willing to pay more taxes for another carrier group. Or two.
I think the days of carriers being “invulnerable” are drawing to a close. First time someone sinks one with an advanced missile will be the last time we put one in harm’s way. They also are extremely expensive to operate, and the aircraft that fly from them have a limited range. They will still be an important part of our defense mix, but fixed air bases are the future.
“Regional power”… Anybody think POTUS went too far in dissing Russia with that description? Or was it just right?
You KNOW that had to rankle old KGB man Putin…
Here’s a link to what I’m talking about… http://mobile.nytimes.com/2014/03/26/world/europe/hague-summit-focuses-on-preventing-trafficking-of-nuclear-materials.html?referrer=
In diplomatic terms, Obama’s “Regional power” reference about Russia may be the equivalent of the apartheid comment made by Kerry about Israel, intended or not. Putin’s well rehearsed public persona is one whose vanity will not tolerate bruising when insulted in public by the president of the United States and he will, based on his actions to date, find a way to dispel any notion that Russia is nothing more than a “Regional power”. Putin is seeking to re-establish the glory days of the USSR and if only by bits and pieces, he will continue his quest to re-establish Russia as a world power. He has already taken Crimea and Georgia into the fold once again.
Pragmatism should be the operative word for America when dealing with sensitive international affairs but to purposely stick a finger in Putin’s eye by Obama serves no purpose at all. Sometimes the wrong words will prompt a person to make a move he or she would not do otherwise. Obama’s words were more provocative than pragmatic or diplomatic. Hopefully I am wrong but in the coming days and weeks, the situation in the Ukraine may heat up to the point of open combat between pro-Russian forces, supported by Russian troops against the Ukraine army.
If it does, what then? Isolation or engagement? And the discussion and debate continues.
By the way, I agree with Brad, well written comments by all.
Putin was Putin long before Obama came on the scene.
The comment was clearly not a Kerry-sequel slip, but a fully vetted decision to call attention to Russia’s – and Putin’s – marginal status.
The best thing to do would be to compile, and publicly release, the extent of Putin’s wealth. That is what will turn off the Russian people. Putin is a bully. You stand up to bullies. Someone has to anyway.
“The comment was clearly not a Kerry-sequel slip, but a fully vetted decision to call attention to Russia’s – and Putin’s – marginal status.” Mark
Never said it was a slip, did I? I agree the comments were fully vetted but once the words were out there in the form of an insult to Putin and Russia’s marginal status, which I seriously doubt is the Putin and Russian viewpoint, look for Putin to make a move to prove his belief Russia is more than a marginal player in a regional power struggle.
A “near-majority” is the same thing as a minority, FWIW, and I’m not sure “less active” necessarily means “isolationist”.
I wonder if it’s more about the type of involvement. To my mind there seem to be two camps of “isolationists”. One is those who are war-weary. 13 years of war is enough. I agree. I think there’s little to be gained with a continued combat presence in Afghanistan. I’d rather tighten the screws on Putin economically than get in a shooting war with Russia over Ukraine. In the other camp are those who think we give away too much money in foreign aid. I’m OK with aid in areas like medicine and development, but military aid just seems to be supply the world with weapons that might one day be used against our own soldiers or citizens. I wish we’d get more involved in places suffering famine or health crises.
I guess I just want our involvement with other countries to be smart. President Obama has handled most issues with a thoughtful, diplomatic approach. We’ll be more successful at winning friends and influencing people by being helpful and measured than by being bossy and belligerent.
Norm, I don’t think it’s all that easy to wall off engagement and say we should just to THIS type and not THAT type. Engagement is engagement. You can’t engage militarily with good effect unless you’re ready to commit all sorts of other resources as well. That’s why we initiated the Marshall Plan after WWII — we had learned that just crushing the enemy and walking away, as we did after the first war, is a bad plan.
The same goes the other way. We learned that it was impossible to feed the starving in Somalia without directly confronting the warlords who used starvation as a weapon. We were making process in degrading the militias when we unfortunately pulled out of Somalia after the battle of Mogadishu — because the American people weren’t prepared for all that engagement entailed in that instance.
Engagement in the world is complex, and it’s risky — and it will often lead to unforeseen circumstances. But I see no wise or moral alternative to it.
And yeah, I realize that what I just said is why a lot of people go from not wanting to make a military commitment to just not wanting to engage at all. Because engagement is messy, and unpredictable.
But I believe nonengagement is as well…
I’m really impressed, gratified and humbled that this post has generated such thoughtful commentary from such a variety of perspectives.
Every time I put up a post on the blog, this is just the kind of discussion that I’m hoping for…
It’s ironic, isn’t it, that we used to fear the “Red Chinese menace” when they were out and out Maoist, 100% dyed-in-the-wool Commie…and now it’s China’s economic might (now that they’ve turned semi-capitalist and are, ahead of schedule, about to supplant us as the world’s largest economy) that has us nervous.
Brad, I’m glad we can identify many areas of common agreement. We just have to agree to disagree about Americans’ supposed isolationism and those poll results.
Bryan’s analysis at top is very persuasive-sounding in many ways, but it is founded on some (to me) very questionable premises. The most glaring is that “whether we defend [Japan and the Philippines] from Chinese aggression is an open question.” If this is triggered by the current Senkaku Islands dispute, the only “open question” is whether we will go to war or threaten action over that dispute in and of itself—and I certainly hope the answer is no. The question of the islands’ ownership goes way back, and is certainly not a slam dunk for either country. Plus, for those who think we should be more combative vis-a-vis Putin…well, I acknowledge at least Crimea is an inhabited place so if people want to argue that, that’s one thing—but if the US shows reluctance to automatically guarantee Japan’s ownership of some uninhabited islands, that hardly calls into question our commitment to the security of actual Japan.
In the same way, our prudence and caution about what can and cannot be accomplished in response to Putin’s moves in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine do not in any way equate to “abandonment of NATO security guarantees.” Many if not most of the Americans who Bryan and Brad might call “isolationist” are not at all opposed to America’s fundamental bottom-line commitment to the security of European or Asian allies. But most of our nation’s tragic missteps (Vietnam, direct and indirect support of dictatorial and murderous Central and South American regimes, the Iraq misadventure) since WWII have not been directly related to these fundamental commitments. Bryan, with all due respect, your doctrine of ” ‘get out in front’ of this sort of thing. We don’t want to allow bigger, broader conflicts to come up” sounds sensible but has been in fact the recipe for wars and injudicious foreign policy moves, in the interest of preventing these purely hypothetical “broader conflicts.”
Phillip – from your keyboard to Lindsey Graham’s ears… please….
“The most glaring [questionable premise] is that ‘whether we defend [Japan and the Philippines] from Chinese aggression is an open question.’ If this is triggered by the current Senkaku Islands dispute, the only “open question” is whether we will go to war or threaten action over that dispute in and of itself—and I certainly hope the answer is no. The question of the islands’ ownership goes way back, and is certainly not a slam dunk for either country…but if the US shows reluctance to automatically guarantee Japan’s ownership of some uninhabited islands, that hardly calls into question our commitment to the security of actual Japan.”
I understand your point here – that maybe some uninhabited islands aren’t worth defending for the USA, because they aren’t Japan proper, and accordingly, our failure to assist Japan in what may be a questionable claim (in our opinion) may not necessarily constitute an abdication of our guarantee to Japan of it’s territorial sovereignty for we consider to be Japan proper.
My response is that it doesn’t matter what YOU think our failure to defend these islands implies, just as it doesn’t matter what MY opinion is. The only relevant opinion is what the government of Japan thinks it implies. If Japan believes that our failure to help them defend the Senkaku islands is an abdication of our guarantee and makes our further commitment an “open question”, then they’ll start to develop their own defense capability, because they won’t want to trust their fate to a less than 100% reliable ally.
Therefore, it really comes down to how the Japanese view us giving up the islands, which amounts to how valuable Japan sees the islands to their national security and territorial integrity. My guess is the answer to that is “a lot”.
Phillip and Bryan present good points for each side but in the end, what we think is not what is important, as Bryan points out, it is what Japan thinks and how Japan perceives our commitment to their defense, national security, and territorial integrity or claims on the Senakuku Islands.
If we should abandon our commitment to Japan over smaller issues, then it makes sense for Japan to then question our commitment on greater matters. Dealing with humans at any level is always a sensitive proposition and human emotions and reactions do count in international affairs. When doubts enter into a committed relationship, i.e. Japan and America, unless they are dispelled quickly, they will take root and grow. This is the conundrum Obama faces on many levels with many of our allies and how he approaches relationships with our long term allies is important.
Obama is dealing with a difficult and changing world, I don’t envy his position. When the past meets the present and older ideas conflict with a changing world, how they are dealt with can have serious consequences, either for the good or bad.
Let China be the world’s policeman for half a century or so.
Tired of seeing American kids dying in foreign lands for people that don’t give a rip.